Silent Data Corruption (SDC) is a serious reliability issue in many domains, including embedded systems. However, current protection techniques are brittle and do not allow programmers to trade off performance for SDC coverage. Further, many require tens of thousands of fault-injection experiments, which are highly time-and resource-intensive. In this article, we propose two empirical models, SDCTune and SDCAuto, to predict the SDC proneness of a program's data. Both models are based on static and dynamic features of the program alone and do not require fault injections to be performed. The main difference between them is that SDCTune requires manual tuning while SDCAuto is completely automated, using machine-learning algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Hardware transient errors are increasing due to shrinking feature sizes and diminishing voltage margins [Borkar 2005; Constantinescu 2008 ]. Conventional hardware-only solutions, such as guard banding and hardware redundancy, are challenging to apply Our approach has three parts. We first identify heuristics that correlate with highly SDC-prone program variables. We then extract these heuristics using fault-injection experiments on a small set of benchmark programs that we use for training purposes. Finally, we integrate the heuristics with manual analysis and machine-learning algorithms to build our models. While the initial identification of the heuristics used in SDCTune and SDCAuto and subsequent training require fault injection, we do not need fault injection to apply our models to new programs.
In this article, we target transient hardware errors; thus, we focus on error detection rather than recovery (as the program can be restarted from a checkpoint to recover from a transient error). We use SDCTune and SDCAuto to identify SDC-prone variables in the program and to derive error detectors for the variables, subject to a given performance overhead. Our detectors recompute the value of the chosen variable(s) by duplicating their backward slice(s), and compare the recomputed value with the original one. We make the following contributions in this article.
-We develop heuristics to identify SDC-prone variables based on an initial faultinjection study (Section 2). These heuristics are based on static analysis and dynamic profile information obtained at runtime (Section 2.5). -We develop a manually tuned model, SDCTune, based on the heuristics developed to identify the relatively SDC-prone variables in a program. We also develop an automatically tuned model, SDCAuto, based on a machine-learning algorithm [Quinlan 1993 ], which can automatically build a regression model from training data. -We then propose an algorithm based on the models to derive error detectors that check the values of the SDC-prone variables at runtime, subject to a given performance overhead constraint specified by the programmer (Section 3). -We evaluate SDCTune and SDCAuto by using them to predict the overall SDC proneness of a program relative to other programs. The results show that both SDCTune and SDCAuto are highly accurate at predicting the overall SDC proneness of a program relative to other programs. The correlation coefficient between the predicted and observed overall SDC ranks (i.e., relative SDC rates) ranges from 0.855 to 0.877 (Section 5). -We evaluate the detectors inserted by our algorithm by performing fault-injection experiments on six different programs from those used in our model extraction, for performance overhead bounds ranging from 10% to 30%. The results show that our detectors can achieve high detection coverage for SDC-causing errors for the given performance overhead. SDCTune achieves 78% to 165% higher efficiencies than full duplication (i.e., ratio of coverage provided to performance overhead incurred), whileSDCAuto achieves 62% to 96% higher efficiencies (Section 5) than full duplication. Both models achieve much higher efficiencies than hot-path duplication.
INITIAL FAULT-INJECTION STUDY
In this section, we empirically study how SDC proneness of instructions is influenced by the data dependency chains in the program. We first define some terms we will use in the article and formalize the protection problem. We then present our fault model in Section 2.2 and describe our fault-injection experiment in Section 2.3. The results of the experiment are discussed in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 develops heuristics for estimating the SDC proneness of program variables based on the results.
Terminology and Protection Model
We first define the following terms in this article: Overall SDC rate: This is the overall probability that a fault leads to an SDC in the program. We denote this by P(SDC).
SDC coverage of an instruction:
We define the SDC coverage of an instruction I to be the probability that an SDC failure is caused by a fault in instruction I's result and thus can be detected by protecting instruction I with a detector. This is denoted as P (I|SDC) .
SDC proneness per instruction: This is the probability that a fault in instruction I leads to an SDC. This is denoted as P(SDC|I).
Dynamic count ratio: This is the ratio of the number of dynamic instances of instruction I executed to the total number of dynamic instructions in the program. This is denoted as P(I).
Our overall goal is to selectively protect instructions with detectors to maximize the SDC detection coverage for a given performance cost budget. The SDC detection coverage of an instruction, P(I|SDC), represents the "fraction of SDCs" that can be detected by protecting instruction I and thus directly represents the importance of the instruction I. Therefore, our goal is find an instruction set inst set that maximizes the I∈inst set P(I|SDC) subject to a certain I∈inst set P(I) specified by the user.
I∈inst set P(I|SDC) is the coverage of SDC causing faults by protecting the instructions in set: inst set while I∈inst set P(I) is the number of dynamic instances of protected instructions (through detectors) and is proportional to the protection overhead.
As mentioned earlier, it is important to understand how P(I|SDC) varies for each instruction in the program. One way to do this is to perform random fault injection into the program and measure P(I|SDC) for each instruction. However, it is difficult to directly measure this probability for each instruction by random fault injection as each instruction may not be injected a sufficient number of times to obtain statistically significant estimates. Instead, we perform a fixed number of fault injections into individual instructions to measure their SDC proneness, P(SDC|I) at a statistically significant level. We then use Bayes' formula to obtain P(I|SDC):
where,
Fault Model
We consider transient hardware faults that occur in processors and corrupt program data. Such faults are usually caused by electrical noise, cosmic rays, or temperature variation. We focus on transient faults because they occur more frequently than permanent errors [Siewiorek 1991 ]. Further, rates of transient errors are projected to increase significantly due to the effects of technology scaling [Shivakumar et al. 2002] . Extending our fault model to permanent errors is a direction for future research. More specifically, we focus on the faults that occur in processors' functional units and registers, (i.e., the ALUs, LSUs, GPRs, and so on) which generally result in a corruption of the program data. However, we do not consider the faults in caches or control logic. Architectural solutions, such as ECC or parity, can protect the chip from the faults in the caches, while faults in the control logic usually trigger hardware exceptions. We do not consider faults in the program's code or program counter, as such faults can be detected by control-flow checking techniques. Finally, as in other work [Hari et al. 2012a; Thomas and Pattabiraman 2013; Feng et al. 2010] , we assume that at most one fault occurs during a program's execution. This is because transient faults are rare relative to the execution times of typical programs.
Fault-Injection Experiment
The goal of our fault-injection experiment is to understand the reasons for SDCs when faults are injected into the program. In other words, we want to study the SDC proneness of instructions in the program and understand how it varies by instruction.
The fault-injection experiment is conducted using LLFI, a program level faultinjection tool, which has been shown to be accurate for measuring SDCs in programs [Wei et al. 2014] . LLFI works at the intermediate representative (IR) level of LLVM compiler infrastructure [Lattner and Adve 2004] , enabling the user to inject faults into the LLVM IR instructions. Using LLFI, we inject into the result of a random dynamic instruction to emulate the effect of a computational error in the program. Specifically, we corrupt the instruction's destination register by flipping a single bit in it (similar to what prior work has done [Hari et al. 2012a; Thomas and Pattabiraman 2013; Feng et al. 2010] [Bailey et al. 1991] , and SPLASH-2 [Woo et al. 1995] benchmark suites, respectively. Note that these benchmarks are only used for the initial fault-injection study; we later derive and validate the model with a larger set of programs. We choose a limited set of benchmarks in this study to balance representativeness with time efficiency for fault injections.
We classify the outcome into four categories: (1) Crash, meaning that the program threw an exception; (2) SDC, which means that the program's output deviated from the fault-free outcome; (3) Hang, which means that the program took significantly longer to execute than a fault-free run; and (4) Benign, which means that the program completed successfully and its output matched the fault-free outcome. These outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Injection Results
The results of our fault-injection experiments show that the top 10% most executed instructions, or those on the hot paths of the program, are responsible for 85% of the SDCs, on average. This result is similar to that of prior work, which has also observed that a small fraction of static program instructions cause most SDCs [Hari et al. 2012a ]. However, this does not mean that all the hot-path instructions should be protected, as they incur high-performance overhead when protected (as we show later). Further, there is considerable variation in SDC rates even among the top 10% most executed instructions, as the following example shows. Table I shows an excerpt from the Bzip2 program on its hot path. The principle described here is observed across all four benchmarks that we studied, but we focus on this (single) basic block for simplicity. The excerpt contains instructions from the LLVM IR, into which we inject faults. Although the original code is in the LLVM IR form, we use C source-like semantics for simplicity. For each instruction in the table, we report its SDC proneness measured by fault injection. It can be observed from the table that some of the instructions have low SDC proneness, even in this highly executed block, for example, instruction 4, 5, 6 . This means that even if a fault occurs in the result of these instructions, it is unlikely to result into an SDC; thus, protecting such instructions will not improve coverage by much, even while incurring high overheads. Therefore, we need to find factors other than execution time that influence the SDC proneness of an instruction.
After investigating further, we found that SDC proneness is highly influenced by data dependencies among the instructions. For example, in Table I , instructions 4 to 8 constitute a data dependency chain whose final result is stored in instruction 10. Instruction 8 is the end of this data dependency chain and has an SDC proneness of 71%. The result of instruction 7 is used in instruction 8; thus, a fault may propagate from instruction 7 to instruction 8. However, the execution of instruction 8 can mask the faulty bit from instruction 7 if the corresponding bit of the result of instruction 2 is 1. This explains why the SDC proneness for instruction 7 is slightly lower than that of instruction 8. The operation of instruction 7 can mask the fault in high bit positions of the second source operand due to architectural wrapping implementation of these shifting operations. The consequence of this masking effect is the low SDC proneness of instructions 4 to 6. In addition to the arithmetic operations, our results show that address calculation operations such as instructions 1, 3, and 9 ("getelementptr" instructions in LLVM) have low SDC proneness. This is because the results of such instructions are usually used for pointer dereferences and are likely to cause segmentation faults that crash the application when corrupted. Thus, we see that to calculate the SDC proneness of an instruction and determine whether it should be protected, one needs to take into account the fault propagation and SDC proneness of the endpoint of its data-dependency chain. These form the basis of our heuristics.
Heuristics
In this section, we list the heuristics for modelling error propagation and for estimating the SDC proneness of instructions in Table II . Details of these heuristics can be found in the conference version of the article [Lu et al. 2014 
APPROACH
In this section, we first extract program features based on the heuristics to describe each store and comparison instruction (Section 3.1). We then build both the SDCTune (Section 3.2) and SDCAuto models (Section 3.3) with extracted features to quantify the estimation of SDC proneness based on empirical data. Finally, we present our approach for choosing the SDC-prone locations subject to a maximum performance overhead using SDCTune and SDCAuto (Section 3.5) and the nature of the detectors we inserted to protect the program (Section 3.6).
Feature Extraction
The first step of building our SDC-proneness estimation model is extracting features. Features are extracted according to our heuristics and based on prior work [Feng et al. 2010; Thomas and Pattabiraman 2013; Cong and Gururaj 2011; Pattabiraman et al. 2005] . Note, however, that the features that are eventually selected to be used in either SDCTune or SDCAuto are determined in the model-building phase, covered in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, respectively. Therefore, we can be conservative at this stage and extract as many features as possible. In total, 66 features are extracted for stored values and 67 for comparisons. The features can be classified into three broad categories. Table III shows an excerpt of all the features we extracted.
Manually Tuned Model: SDCTune
Both SDCTune and SDCAuto are built from fault injections over a set of training programs with the features presented earlier. We start building SDCTune by modelling the SDC proneness of store and comparison instructions in the program. The SDC proneness of these instructions depends on categorical features such as resilient comparisons and on numerical features such as data width (Section 2.5). We manually apply classification to model the categorical features and linear regression to model the numerical ones. Once we determine the SDC proneness of the store and branch instructions, we use the data dependencies for estimating the SDC proneness of other instructions. We explain the classification and regression methods here.
Classification. The goal of classification is to use the categorical features extracted earlier to classify the stored values or comparison results into different groups so that we can apply the numerical features (or arithmetic means) to quantify the SDC proneness of each group. This classification is done manually according to our empirical data. For each division in the model, we first select features that can be covered by our heuristics. We then adopt those features to split our current group into several subgroups. We recursively split these subgroups with our heuristics until all the heuristics are utilized.
Different categories of stored values and comparison results have different categorical features (these are part of our heuristics) for determining their SDC proneness (e.g., resilient comparisons or not for Cmp NoAddr stored values, and used in output or not for NoCmp NoAddr ones). Therefore, we apply tree-structured classification so that different features can be used in different categories. The features are arranged hierarchically in the form of a tree, starting from a root node and partitioning the nodes based on different features recursively until all the data in a leaf node belongs to a single category.
An example tree is shown in Figure 1 . In the tree, consider the Cmp NoAddr storedvalues category that we introduced in Section 2.5. This constitutes one of the four partitions from the root node of all stored values. We then split this group into two groups: ResCmp NoAddr and UnresCmp NoAddr. As the tree grows, ResCmp NoAddr will then be divided again based on whether the value is a global variable, while UnresCmp NoAddr will be split based on whether it is accumulative computation. Finally, we generate a tree that partitions all stored values into its leaf nodes.
Regression. Regression is applied on the leaf nodes of the classification tree to factor in the effects of numerical features such as data width. For example, consider a leaf node of stored values: Addr NoCmp->Not Used in Masking Operations. We find that the SDC proneness of stored values in this node satisfies the following equation:P(SDC|I) = −0.012 * data width + 0.878. This expression was derived using linear regression based on the results from fault injection over a set of training programs in Section 4.1. The reason for the negative correlation in this equation is that the higher bit positions of stored values in leaf Addr NoCmp->Not Used in Masking Operations are very likely to cause application crash if they are corrupted. Since values with larger data width have a higher probability of being corrupted in higher bit positions, faults that occur in those values are less likely to cause SDCs, as they are more likely to cause the program to crash. For the leaf nodes that do not exhibit a correlation with numerical features, we take the arithmetic means as the estimation of their SDC proneness.
Automatically Tuned Model: SDCAuto
Unlike SDCTune, our automatically tuned model, SDCAuto, is built automatically using a machine-learning approach known as the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm [Quinlan 1993] . Our goal here is to demonstrate that machine learning can be used to learn the model automatically and not to necessarily find the best approach for machine learning. We choose the CART algorithm due to three reasons:
(1) The built tree model is simple to understand and to interpret. On the contrary, results from other models, such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), may be more difficult to interpret. The generated CART can help us gain a better understanding of the relation between SDC proneness and program features by picking out the features showing strong correlation with SDC proneness. (2) The CART is able to handle both numerical and categorical data. Many of the features that we extracted are categorical data, for example, is_global, is_integer and is_fcmp, while some other features are numerical, for example, loop_depth, dominated_execution_time, and data_width. Other regression algorithms may not support a mix of categorical data and numerical data. (3) The CART model is one of the decision-tree models that requires little data preparation [Breiman et al. 1984] . Other regression models, such as support vector machine (SVM) and Gaussian process, rely on an appropriate normalization method of input data, which needs delicate tuning based on the application scenarios. However, in our case, the orders of magnitude may be very different for different features (e.g., execution time-related features and code structure-related features), thus are very difficult to normalize.
However, one disadvantage of the CART algorithm is that the tree may grow to be biased if some classes of data dominate. In our case, the tree may be biased toward some training programs because of the large number of data points from them while ignoring other training programs. To balance the dataset between different training programs, we define data point threshold as a parameter to constrain the maximum number of data points allowed per application for stored values and comparisons. Store and comparison instructions will be ranked in the decreasing order of their dynamic counts, and only the top ones are incorporated. This is because highly executed instructions are more valuable for SDC proneness estimation (Equation (2)). The number of instructions that we incorporate from each program is limited by the data point threshold.
Our decision tree is built based on the Mean Squared Error (MSE) criteria. The goal is to minimize the MSE of the tree, which represents the information gain. The algorithm splits the training dataset recursively to divide the data points into multiple groups until the divided groups have data points fewer than a threshold value, namely, the minimum size of leaves. The end groups are known as leaves and the average value (i.e., SDC proneness) are assigned as the value of each leaf. For each split, the decisiontree algorithm will select a feature and find an optimal threshold for splitting the node according to the feature that maximizes the MSE reduction.
In this algorithm, the growth of the trees is controlled by the parameters: minimum size of leaves and data point threshold. We study the influence of these parameters later. Figure 2 shows an example of our built decision tree for stored values with 17 points as minimum size of leaves and 80 instructions as data point threshold.
Model Usage
Once the trees are built from the training dataset, we can use them to estimate the SDC proneness of the stored values and comparison results of the testing programs. The estimated SDC proneness of those endpoints of data dependency chains will be back-propagated along their backward slices to derive the SDC proneness of each instruction with fault masking or crashing rate considered. Then, the SDC proneness of each instruction will be used to calculate the importance of the instruction and guide the selection of instructions to duplicate and check under a specific overhead bound as, described in Section 4.3.
Choosing the Instructions
As shown in Section 2.4, we can calculate the SDC coverage of protecting an instruction if we know the SDC proneness of that instruction using Equation (1) in Section 2.1. We apply either the SDCTune model or SDCAuto model to estimate the SDC proneness of each instruction in the program that we want to protect. We also obtain the dynamic count of each instruction in the program by profiling it with representative inputs. We then attempt to choose instructions to maximize the SDC coverage subject to a given performance overhead (Section 2.4) using a standard dynamic programming algorithm [Martello and Toth 1990 ].
Detector Design
Once we identify a set of instructions to protect, the next step is to insert error detectors at these instructions. Our detectors are based on duplicating the backward slices of the instructions to protect, similar to prior work [Feng et al. 2010] . We insert a check immediately after the instructions to be protected, which compares the original value computed by the instruction with the value computed by the duplicated instructions. Any difference in these values is deemed to be an error detection and the program is stopped. Figure 3(b) shows a conceptual example of our detector for a given set of instructions to be protected in Figure 3(a) .
Note that we assume that there is a single transient fault in the program (Section 2.2); thus, it is not possible for both the detector and the chosen instruction to be erroneous simultaneously. Therefore, any transient error in the computation performed by the chosen instruction will be detected by the corresponding error detector.
A naïve implementation of our detectors can result in prohibitive performance overhead. Therefore, we develop two optimizations to lower the detector overhead. First, we concatenate adjacent duplicated pieces of code by adding the instructions between them to the protection set so that we can combine their detectors. Figure 3 (c) shows how this optimization works for the conceptual example. This optimization provides benefits when the cost of the saved detector is higher than the cost due to the added instructions. Second, we perform lazy checking, in which detectors for cumulative computations in loops are moved out of the loop bodies. This optimization is effective for long running loops, where the cost of running the check in every loop iteration is high.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we empirically evaluate both the SDCTune and SDCAuto models for configurable SDC protection through fault-injection experiments. All the experiments and evaluations are conducted on an Intel i7 4-core machine with 8GB memory running Debian Linux. Section 4.1 presents the details of benchmarks and Section 4.2 presents our evaluation metrics. Section 4.3 presents our methodology and workflow for performing the experiments.
Benchmarks
We choose a total of 12 applications from a wide variety of domains for training and testing both of our models. The applications are drawn from the SPEC [Henning 2000], SPLASH2 [Woo et al. 1995] , NAS parallel [Bailey et al. 1991] , PARSEC [Bienia et al. 2008] and Parboil [Stratton et al. 2012 ] benchmark suites. We randomly divide the 12 applications into two groups, one group for training and the other for testing. The four benchmarks used in Section 2.3 to derive the heuristics are drawn from the training group. The details of these training and testing benchmarks are shown in Table IV  and Table V , respectively. We also show the inputs used for running them. Later, we will swap the testing and training benchmarks. All the applications are compiled and linked into native executables with -O2 optimization flags and run in a single-threaded mode, as our current implementation of both SDCTune and SDCAuto models work only with single-threaded programs. This is not a fundamental limitation of our technique, but rather a limitation of our implementation.
Evaluation Method
We evaluate our SDC proneness estimation model from three perspectives, as follows.
Regression Results from Decision Tree Model.
To evaluate the regression results, we calculate the average squared errors for both the training and testing dataset. As shown in Section 3.3, there are two parameters controlling the tree-building process:
(1) minimum size of leaves, and (2) data point threshold. To explore this twodimensional parameter space, we vary the minimum size of leaves from 1 to 120 points per leaf and data point threshold from 10 to 120 data points per program. Average squared errors for both the training and testing datasets are calculated for each point in our exploration space. Two optimal pairs of parameters are picked out and used for the following evaluations for the stored-value decision tree and comparison decision tree, respectively. We also present the features that are adopted by the optimal trees as these are the features that show strong correlations with SDC proneness. Note that we perform brute-force search of the space above to fully characterize the space of the model's parameters. One can also employ techniques such as gradient descent to speed up the traversal process at the cost of having less coverage of the space.
Estimation of Overall SDC Rates.
We perform a statistical fault injection experiment to determine the overall SDC rate of the application. We then compare the SDC rate estimated by both of our models with that obtained from the fault-injection experiment. We use the same fault-injection setup as described in Section 2.3. We also measure the correlation between our estimated SDC rates and SDC rates from fault injection. The correlation coefficient shows the capability of using our models in comparing SDC rates among different applications.
SDC Coverages for Different Performance Overhead Bounds.
The SDC coverage is defined as the fraction of SDC causing errors detected by our detectors. We apply both the SDCTune model and SDCAuto model to predict the SDC coverage for different instructions to satisfy the performance overhead bounds provided by the user. Our selection algorithm (Section 3.5) starts with the instructions providing the highest coverage, and iteratively expands the set of instructions until the performance overhead bounds are met. We then perform fault-injection experiments on the program instrumented with our detectors and measure the percentage(s) of SDCs detected 1 . We also compare our results with those of full duplication, that is, when every instruction is duplicated in the program, and with that of hot-path duplication, that is, when the top 10% most executed instructions are duplicated in the program.
To ensure a fair comparison among these techniques, we use a metric called the SDC detection efficiency, which is similar to the efficiency metric defined in prior work [Shafique et al. 2013] . We define the SDC detection efficiency as the ratio between SDC coverage and performance overhead for a detection technique. We calculate the SDC detection efficiency of each benchmark under a given performance overhead bound provided by the user and compare it with the corresponding efficiencies of full duplication and hot-path duplication (these correspond to 10% of the paths that account for 90% of the execution time). The SDC coverage of full duplication is assumed to be 100%, as it can detect all single errors [Reis et al. 2005] . Note that full duplication techniques cannot be configured to be selective; thus, we cannot consider different overhead bounds as we do for the other techniques. Further, full duplication can detect some errors much earlier, as it checks after every instruction while we do not. However, we do not consider detection latency in our experiments. Figure 4 shows the workflow for selecting parameters and measuring the regression results of the decision trees that are parts of SDCAuto model. The workflow explores the parameter space, which consists of minimum size of leaves and data point threshold to test their influences on the regression results.
Workflow and Implementation

Finding Optimal Parameters of Decision Trees.
We first compile the application using LLVM into its IR form. We then extract the features that SDCAuto needs to estimate the SDC proneness of stored values and comparison results. This is done using an automated compiler pass that we wrote in LLVM and the LAMPView tool [Mason et al. 2009 ] for analyzing load/store dependencies. We also need initial SDC proneness data for each stored value and comparison instructions to build our decision tree model. This is obtained by fault injections. However, the fault injections are done for building the models only-utilizing the built models does not require fault injection. Once the training data and testing data are ready, we build regression trees for stored values and comparison instructions with the minimum size of leaves iterating from 1 to 120 and the data point threshold iterating from 10 to 120. For each combination of minimum size of leaves and data point threshold, we calculate the MSE for both training data and testing data to measure the influences of the two parameters. The values of the minimum size of leaves and data point threshold with the minimum MSE of testing data are selected as optimal parameters of regression trees. Figure 5 shows the workflow for estimating the overall SDC rates and providing configurable protection using either the SDCTune model or SDCAuto model. The workflow requires the following inputs from the user: (1) source code for the program, (2) a set of representative input(s) for executing the application, and (3) output function calls that generate the output data that are important to the user in terms of SDC failures (as mentioned before, not all output data in an application is important from the perspective of SDCs, e.g., statistical or timing information in the output; we therefore exclude these from consideration). In addition, it requires the user to specify the maximum allowable performance overhead that may be incurred by the detectors inserted by our technique for the given set of representative inputs. As before, we first compile the source code and extract features from the compiled IR. Then, we select to run the extracted features through either the SDCTune or the SDCAuto model built in Section 3, to generate an estimated SDC proneness for each instruction. We then use the results from our model to estimate the overall SDC rate of the application and for inserting detectors into the program for protecting the most SDC-prone instructions within the given overhead bound. The detectors are inserted by another LLVM pass that we wrote. We use the representative inputs provided by the user to execute the program for obtaining its execution time with the detectors 2 . This process of choosing instructions to protect is repeated iteratively until the designated performance overhead bound is fulfilled. If we exceed the performance overhead bound, we backtrack and remove the most recently inserted detectors and repeat the process. This is a heuristic, as the problem of choosing an optimal set of detectors for a given overhead is NP-hard (it is an instance of the well-known zero-one knapsack problem). Other heuristics are also possible. Finally, we generate the executable fortified with the detectors using the LLVM backend; we use it to measure its performance overhead and fault coverage by executing it on the target hardware.
Measuring Overall SDC Estimation and Coverage.
RESULTS
This section presents the results of our experiments to (1) explore the parameter space for our decision tree model for SDCAuto, (2) estimate the overall SDC rate of an application with both SDCTune and SDCAuto models, and (3) apply configurable protection to maximize detection coverage under different performance overhead bounds.
In our experiments, both SDCTune and SDCAuto models require 5min to 50min (average of 24min), depending on the application, to estimate the overall SDC rate and to generate a fortified executable protected with detectors for a given performance overhead. Most of the time is spent on the Feature extraction and Selection algorithm, which requires 1min to 45min (average 10.08min) and 5s to 49min (average 14.67min), respectively. On the contrary, fault injection alone requires anywhere from a few hours to a few days to generate the SDC rates for each application. Further, estimating the SDC-prone locations in a program using fault injection requires even more faultinjection experiments to achieve statistical significance. Further, it requires significant manual effort to map the results of the fault injection back to the program's code, which is necessary for placing detectors. 
Effect of Decision-Tree Parameters
We explored the parameter spaces for the stored value decision tree and comparison instruction decision tree. Figure 6 shows the MSEs for the decision trees under different minimum sizes of leaves and data point thresholds for the training and testing datasets. From the figure, we can observe that overfitting occurs as we expected when the minimum size of leaves is too small and incomplete learning occurs when the value is too large. At the same time, a large data point threshold may introduce imbalance in the training dataset and worsen the regression result, as shown in Figure 6(d) , while a small value of this parameter can hinder the tree-splitting process and decrease the accuracy, as shown in Figure 6 (c) and Figure 6 (a). Based on these graphs, we consider minimum size of leaves = 17, data point threshold = 80 as optimal for stored values, and minimum size of leaves = 57, data point threshold = 40 as optimal for comparison instructions.
Estimation of Overall SDC Rates
We estimate the overall SDC rates of the applications using the SDCTune model and SDCAuto model, then compare them with the SDC rates obtained through 3000 random fault injections per benchmark. Table VI shows the overall SDC rates (P(SDC)) from the fault injections and the estimated overall SDC rates (P(SDC)) for both training Fig. 7 . The correlation of overall SDC rates for all programs. The x-axis is the overall SDC rates from 3000 random-fault injections; the y-axis is the estimated overall SDC rates using either SDCTune or SDCAuto.
programs and testing programs. The SDC rates are statistically significant, with an error bar ranging from 1.78% (Lbm) to 0.71% (Swaptions) at the 95% confidence intervals. From Table VI , it can be observed that the absolute values of the estimated SDC rates do not match with the observed ones accurately. For example, for bzip2 the actual SDC rate is 24.47%, while SDCTune and SDCAuto estimate it to be 17.88% and 19.78%, respectively. However, when we consider the ranks of the SDC rates predicted by the model, the accuracy is high. Figure 7 plots the estimated SDC ranks versus the observed ranks for both the SDCTune and SDCAuto models. The Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.8770 for our SDCTune model and 0.8545 for SDCAuto model, showing a strong positive correlation for both models with regard to the SDC ranks.
Thus, our models are highly accurate in comparing SDC rates of applications relative to others. However, they are not accurate at predicting the absolute rates of SDCs. There are two reasons for this inaccuracy. First, our estimation of SDC rates is conservative, and sometimes may overestimate the SDC proneness of variables in the presence of application-specific masking. Second, our load-store dependence analysis is performed using the LAMPView tool, which does not handle some library functions, such as memcpy.
From our results, we find that, despite the inaccuracy in predicting absolute SDC rates, our models can guide detector placement to obtain high coverage at low performance overheads. This is because we are more interested in comparing sets of variables with each other when deciding which ones to choose for detector placement rather than estimate absolute SDC rates.
SDC Coverage and Detection Efficiency
We use both of our models for inserting error detectors into the applications to maximize SDC coverage under a given performance overhead. Figure 9(a) shows the SDC coverage obtained by the SDCTune model for each benchmark under three different performance overhead bounds: 10%, 20%, and 30%. For the training programs, the geometric means 3 of the SDC coverage for the 10%, 20%, and 30% overhead bounds are 34.8%, 71.1%, and 78.9%, respectively. For the testing programs, the corresponding geometric means are 37.0%, 58.4%, and 74.8%, respectively, which are somewhat lower than the training programs' averages (as expected). We also measured the SDC coverage obtained with hot-path duplication and found it to be 74.28% and 92.33%, on average, for training and testing programs, respectively. Recall that we assumed the coverage of full duplication to be 100%.
Figure 10(a) shows the SDC coverage obtained by the SDCAuto model. The geometric means of the SDC coverage are 31.14%, 66.32%, and 76.03%, respectively, for the training programs. For the testing programs, the geometric means are 27.37%, 45.70%, and 67.63%, respectively, at the 10%, 20%, and 30% performance overhead bounds. Figure 8 shows the performance overhead of full duplication and hot-path duplication. The overhead of full duplication is 50.16%, on average, for the training programs, while it is 71.37%, on average. for the testing programs. Hot-path duplication has an overhead of 33.19% for the training programs and 61.76% for the testing programs. Note that both of these overheads are higher than the 30% overhead bound we considered with our detectors.
We also calculate the detection efficiency of the detectors that we inserted and that of hot-path duplication based on their overhead and SDC coverages (Section 4.2). Figure 9(b) and Figure 10(b) show the SDC detection efficiency of our detectors with the three overhead bounds and the efficiency of hot-path duplication. The efficiencies are normalized to that of full duplication, which has a baseline efficiency of 1. An efficiency value close to 1 means that it is not much better than full duplication.
For detectors inserted using the SDCTune model, we observe SDC detection efficiencies of 1.75x, 1.78x, and 1.32x for the training programs and 2.65x, 2.09x, and 1.78x for the testing programs at the 10%, 20%, and 30% performance overhead bounds, respectively. On the other hand, detectors inserted using the SDCAuto model have detection efficiencies of 1.56x, 1.67x, and 1.27x over full duplication for the training programs and 1.96x, 1.64x, and 1.62x over full duplication for the testing programs. We observe higher detection efficiencies for our testing programs because the full duplication overheads of the testing programs are often higher than the training programs. This results in a lower baseline for the testing programs in terms of detection efficiencies. More details are provided in Section 6. The reason that the efficiencies generally decrease as overheads increase is that some of the instructions protected at higher overhead are not as SDC prone. As the performance overhead of the detectors approaches that of full duplication, the detection efficiencies will drop to 1.
We also observe no gain in efficiency with hot-path duplication compared to full duplication in spite of its higher coverage than our technique, as it incurs correspondingly higher overhead (as mentioned in Section 2.4). Thus, placing detectors on the hot paths of the application is not much better than full duplication in terms of efficiency. In contrast, our technique significantly outperforms both full duplication and hot-path duplication in providing better detection efficiency for much lower performance overhead bounds.
To get a better sense of how dependent the results are on the choices of the testing and training sets, we repeated our experiments on our SDCAuto model with the swapped training and testing sets. The results show a similar trend in general but with better coverages and efficiencies for the original testing programs, which are used as training programs now. Figure 11 (a) and Figure 11 (b) show the SDC detection coverage results and the normalized SDC detection efficiency results, respectively. The overall coverage and efficiency values of the testing sets are similar in both cases, showing that the model is not highly sensitive to the choices of these two sets.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss the differences between benchmarks when using the SDCTune model (Section 6.1). Then, we discuss the reasons of different results between the SDCTune model and the auto-tuned model: SDCAuto (Section 6.2).
Differences between Benchmarks for SDCTune
There are two main reasons for the differences in the detection efficiency among benchmarks. First, for our technique to be efficient, it needs to protect instructions with high SDC proneness but with low dynamic execution count. We observed that applications with such instructions experience moderate SDC rates, which are neither too high nor too low. From Table VI, programs such as Libquantum, Bfs, Mcf , Bzip2, and Ocean fall into this category. Generally, these programs benefit the most from the SDCTune model (Figure 9(b) ). However, the detectors inserted in Mcf and Ocean have higher overhead so that the SDC coverage of these two benchmarks is lower in general under the same performance overhead bound. Mcf has a large amount of comparison operations for branches at runtime so that many more check instructions need to be inserted (Section 3.6), which incur higher performance overheads. For Ocean, many of its dynamic instances are floating point operations, which cause higher overhead when duplicated because processors usually have very limited ALU resources for float-point operations.
On the other hand, if the benchmark has highly SDC-prone instructions that are also highly executed, our technique does not do as well since the overhead limit prevents our technique from selecting those SDC-prone instructions, which also incur high overheads. Examples of these programs are Lbm and IS.
The second reason for the variation in efficiency among benchmarks relative to full duplication is that the overhead of full duplication is not uniform, as shown in Figure 8 . We found that for some benchmarks-such as IS, Bfs, and Bzip2-the full duplication overhead is only about 40%. This means that the detection-efficiency improvement over full duplication is unlikely to be very high for these benchmarks. For example, even though the detection coverage for the benchmarks IS, Bfs, and Swaptions is reasonable, their detection efficiency is not very high. In Lbm, our detectors have a lower detection efficiency compared to full duplication. This is because nearly all SDCprone instructions in the program have high execution counts; thus, the performance overhead bounds cannot be satisfied if they are selected for protection. Therefore, this benchmark has low SDC coverage with our technique.
Differences between the SDCTune and SDCAuto Models
Compared with the results of the SDCTune model, the SDCAuto model performs worse across benchmarks. This suggests that the regression trees built by SDCAuto are not as robust as the ones built by manual analysis in SDCTune.
In the SDCTune model, classification depends on the data dependencies among the comparison results. These variables are directly grouped according to their usage and side effects. However, categorizing comparison instructions requires applying multiple features at the same time, for example, is_loop_terminator and nest_loop_depth, which are not supported in the decision-tree algorithm of SDCAuto. This makes the tree unable to split the training data according to the usage of instructions, as a result of which it fails to estimate the SDC proneness of comparison instructions accurately.
In addition, as shown in Figure 2 , the regression tree for stored values also fails in categorizing the training data according to the four major usage groups (see Section 2.5). All four groups need further division to distinguish instructions with high SDC proneness from those with low SDC proneness. Since our decision-tree algorithm determines the splitting points based on MSE criteria, the trees are not likely to split at these features.
Thus, the SDCAuto model performs worse than the SDCTune model, but still manages to outperform full duplication and hot-path duplication in terms of efficiency (by 62% to 96%). Further, the SDCAuto model does not require any programmer effort to build and apply, making it a much more practical proposition for developers.
RELATED WORK
We classify related work into three categories: (1) duplication-based techniques, (2) invariant-based techniques, and (3) application-specific techniques.
Duplication-based techniques: SWIFT [Reis et al. 2005 ] is a compiler-based technique that uses full duplication to detect faults in program data. However, full duplication can have significant performance overhead, especially in embedded systems that do not have as many idle resources to mask the overhead of duplication. As shown in Figure 9 (b) and Figure 10 (b), SDCTune and SDCAuto both outperform full duplication in terms of SDC detection efficiency and enable configurability to protect programs from SDC causing errors under various given performance overheads. One of the earliest papers on identifying critical variables in programs and selectively protecting them is by Pattabiraman et al. [2005] . Unlike our work, they focus mostly on crash-causing errors, which are relatively easy to detect compared to SDCs. Further, they do not provide configurable protection in their work. Feng et al. [2010] and Khudia et al. [2012] have attempted to reduce the overhead of full duplication by duplicating only "high-value" instructions (and variables), in which a fault is unlikely to be detected by other techniques and thus leads to SDCs. Unlike our work, however, they do not provide a mechanism to configure the protection for a given performance overhead bound. This is especially important for embedded systems, for which the system has to satisfy strict performance constraints.
Another branch of work [Lee et al. 2009; Cong and Gururaj 2011; Thomas and Pattabiraman 2013; de Kruijf et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2011] has focused on protecting soft-computing applications from soft errors by duplicating only critical instructions or data in the program. Examples of soft-computing applications are those used in media processing and machine learning, which can tolerate a certain amount of errors in their outputs. These papers exploit the resilience of soft-computing applications to come up with targeted protection mechanisms. However, they cannot be applied in general-purpose applications, which are not as error resilient.
Finally, in recent work, Shafique et al. [2013] propose a technique for exploiting fault masking in applications to provide efficient detection. Similar to our work, they rank the vulnerability of instructions in the program and allow the user to specify performance overhead bounds to selectively choose instructions to protect. However, our work differs from theirs in two ways. First, they consider all failures as equally bad, including crashes and hangs. We focus exclusively on SDC-causing faults, which are the most insidious of faults. Therefore, we can achieve higher detection efficiency for protecting against SDC-causing faults. Second, their work employs three metrics to determine the instructions to protect, all of which are estimated by performing a static analysis of the application's control and dataflow graph, which is conservative by nature. In contrast, our work uses empirical data to build the model for estimating the SDC proneness of different instructions; thus, it is relatively less conservative. Since Shafique et al. do not provide a breakdown of their coverage among SDC failures, crashes, and hangs, we cannot quantitatively compare the coverage of SDCTune and SDCAuto with their technique.
Invariant-based techniques: Sahoo et al. [2008] , Ernst et al. [1999] , and Pattabiraman et al. [2006] detect errors by extracting likely invariants in programs through runtime profiling and dependency analysis. Those likely invariants are used as assertions to check abnormal behaviors or data out-of-bounds to detect errors. Invariant-based techniques typically have lower overhead than duplication-based techniques, as the assertions consist of much fewer instructions than the entire backward slice of the variables. However, an important limitation of this class of techniques is that they incur false positives, that is, they can detect an error even when none occurs. This is because they all learn invariants from testing inputs, and these invariants may not hold when the program is running with real inputs in production (which may differ from the test inputs). While our work also learns the model for SDC proneness based on training applications, it uses static analysis to actually derive the detectors from the backward slices; thus, it incurs no false positives, as static analysis is conservative.
Application specific techniques: Hari et al. [2012a] propose a set of detectors for detecting SDCs using program-level detectors. Similar to our work, they also come up with a method to choose variables to protect for maximizing the SDC coverage under a given performance overhead bound. However, there are two differences between our work and theirs. First, they require fault injections to find the highly SDC-prone variables in the program, which is time-consuming. Although they reduce the faultinjection space using their Relyzer technique [Hari et al. 2012b] , they still need to perform tens of thousands of injections. In contrast, we use our model to determine the SDC-prone locations without needing any fault injections. Second, their detector derivation is done manually based on understanding of the program. Further, some of their detectors are application-specific and cannot be generalized across programs, as they rely on specific algorithmic properties. In contrast, we use generic duplicationbased detectors that are automatically derived for any application.
CONCLUSION
As hardware errors increase with technology scaling, SDCs are becoming more serious for a wide class of systems. Generic solutions, such as full duplication, incur high performance overhead as they do not prioritize protecting against SDC-causing errors. This article proposes a configurable protection technique for SDC-causing errors that allows users to trade off performance for reliability. We develop heuristics for estimating the SDC proneness of instructions and build a manually tuned model, SDCTune, and an automatically tuned model, SDCAuto, based on the heuristics and a decision-tree algorithm. We then use our models to guide the selection of instructions to be protected with error detectors. Our results show that the detectors inserted using SDCTune outperform full duplication by 78% to 165% in detection efficiency, while those inserted using SDCAuto outperform full duplication by a factor of 62% to 96%.
